Secure Consistency Verification for Untrusted Cloud Storage by Public
  Blockchains by Li, Kai et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
06
62
6v
3 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
9 J
ul 
20
19
Secure Consistency Verification for Untrusted Cloud
Storage by Public Blockchains
Kai Li Yu-zhe (Richard) Tang Beom Heyn (Ben) Kim † Jianliang Xu ‡
Syracuse University, New York, USA
†University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada
‡Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
Abstract. This work presents ContractChecker, a Blockchain-based security proto-
col for verifying the storage consistency between mutually distrusting cloud provider
and clients. Unlike existing protocols, the ContractChecker uniquely delegates log
auditing to the Blockchain, and has the advantages in reducing client cost and lower-
ing requirements on client availability, lending itself to modern scenarios with mobile
and web clients.
The ContractChecker collects the logs from both clients and cloud server, and veri-
fies the consistency by cross-checking the logs. By this means, it does not only detect
the attacks from malicious clients and server forging their logs, but also is able to
mitigate those attacks and recover the system from them. In addition, we design new
attacks against ContractChecker exploiting various limits in real Blockchain systems
(e.g., write unavailability, Blockchain forks, contract race conditions). We analyze
and harden the security of ContractChecker protocols under these proposed new at-
tacks.
We implement a functional prototype of the ContractChecker on Ethereum/Solidity.
By experiments on private and public Ethereum testnets, we extensively evaluate the
cost of the ContractChecker in comparison with that of existing client-based log au-
diting works. The result shows the ContractChecker can scale to hundreds of clients
and save client costs by more than one order of magnitude. The evaluation result
verifies our design motivation of delegating log auditing to the Blockchain in Con-
tractChecker.
1 Introduction
Today, the cloud-storage consistency is a pressingly important security property. With a
cloud storage service (e.g., Dropbox [4] and Amazon S3 [1]), the consistency indicates
how reads/writes should be ordered and whether a read should reflect the latest write (i.e.,
freshness). This property is exploitable to a malicious cloud provider and leads to severe
security consequences. For instance, when the cloud storage hosts a public-key directory
(as in certificate-transparency schemes [2]), a malicious cloud violating storage consistency
can return to the user a revoked public key, leading to consequences like impersonation
attacks and unauthorized data access. Making a trustworthy assertion about cloud storage
consistency is fundamental to supporting information-security infrastructure in the clouds,
such as public-key directories, software-update registry, personal device synchronization,
etc.
Asserting the storage consistency in a client-server system entails two conceptual steps:
W1) establishing a globally consistent view of operation log across clients (i.e., operation
log attestation), and W2) auditing the log for checking consistency conditions (i.e., log
auditing). To the best of our knowledge, all existing approaches including Caelus [16],
CloudProof [20], and Catena [23], assume trusted clients and rely on them to audit the log.
More specifically, they make a single party attest to the log of operations (step W1) and
send the attested log to individual clients, each of which audits the log against her local
operations (W2). In particular, Catena [23] is a novel scheme that makes log attestation
based on the Blockchain (W1 on Blockchain), yet still uses clients for log auditing (W2
by clients). These client-based log auditing schemes require high client availability (i.e.,
all clients have to participate in the protocol execution) and incur high client cost (i.e., a
client needs to store the global operation log of all other clients), rendering them ill-suited
for applications with a large number of low-end and stateless clients; see § 3.1 for a list of
target applications.
We propose ContractChecker, a secure Blockchain-based consistency verification pro-
tocol. Distinct from existing works, ContractChecker uniquely delegates both log attesta-
tion (W1) and log auditing (W2) to the Blockchain. Concretely, ContractChecker runs a
program on the Blockchain (i.e., the so-called smart contracts) to collect log attestations
from clients and the server and to audit the log there for making the consistency assertion.
Comparing existing works, our approach, by delegating log auditing to Blockchain, has the
advantage in lowering client availability requirement (i.e., only active clients who interact
with the cloud are required to participate in the protocol) and in minimizing client overhead
(i.e., a client only maintains her own operations for a limited period of time).
While it seems straightforward to delegate the log auditing to Blockchain as a trusted
third party (TTP), putting this idea into a secure protocol and system raises the following
challenges: 1) How to securely collect and audit logs from mutually distrusting clients and
server (detailed in § 5.2)? 2) Real-world Blockchain systems are far from an ideal TTP and
can be exploited to attack a log-auditing service on Blockchain (detailed in § 5.3). First, a
ContractChecker party, be it a client or the server, can be malicious and forge operations in
her log attestation in order to trick ContractChecker to make an incorrect assertion about
the storage consistency.We propose to cross-check the attestations from both the server and
clients to detect any mismatch and log-forging attacks. In addition, in the presence of such
attacks, we propose mitigation techniques (in § 5.2) for the ContractChecker to securely
attribute the cause of the attacks such that it can make a correct assertion despite of the
attacks.
Second, real-world Blockchain systems are known to be limited in terms of E1) write
unavailability (i.e., a valid transaction could be dropped by the Blockchain), E2) exploitable
smart-contract race conditions (i.e., incorrect contract logic can be triggered by running
contract code concurrently), and E3) Blockchain forks (i.e., a Blockchain network or
data structure can be forked to multiple instances). We propose attacks against the use of
Blockchain in the context of ContractChecker. These new attacks systematically exploit the
Blockchain limitations mentioned above, and they are: a selective-omission attack exploit-
ing Blockchain write unavailability (E1), a forking attack exploiting smart-contract race
conditions (E2), and another version of forking attack exploiting Blockchain forks (E3).
We propose countermeasures to defend the Blockchain-oriented ContractChecker at-
tacks. To prevent write unavailability (E1), we increase the transaction fee during client
attestations to improve the chance of Blockchain accepting a transaction in a certain period
of time. To prevent the race conditions on ContractChecker (E2), we define a small criti-
cal section in the contract to secure the contract execution yet without losing the support
of concurrent server and client attestations. We prevent forking through Blockchain forks
(E3) by ensuring all clients and server be aware of the presence of all Blockchain forks.
We build a system prototype of ContractChecker based on Ethereum [5]. The on-chain
part runs a smart contract (in Solidity) that collects log attestations from clients and the
server, crosschecks them and audits the log with consistency conditions. We envision a
novel application of ContractChecker to enforce a consistency-centric service-level agree-
ment (SLA) with cloud providers.
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We conduct cost analysis and experimental analysis on our prototype. We evaluate the
client cost of the protocol and service under YCSBworkloads [13]. Our results show that on
Ethereum, ContractChecker results in significant cost saving on the client side, with reason-
able Gas cost on running smart contract. We also measure the gas cost of ContractChecker
and present the evaluation in technical report [9] (due to space limits). It shows the practi-
cality of ContractChecker to the extent of supporting 613710 operations at the cost of $100
at a real Ether price.
The contributions of this work are:
1. New use of Blockchain: This work addresses verifying cloud consistency based on
public Blockchain. Unlike existing research, the work delegates log auditing to Blockchain,
which has the advantage of reducing client costs and availability requirements. Based on
this new use of Blockchain, we propose the ContractChecker consistency-verification pro-
tocol (§ 2 and § 4.1).
2. Secure protocol design: We present a secure protocol design for ContractChecker
among distrusting clients and cloud provider. The protocol cross-checks logs collected from
different parties and then conduct consistency checks. It not only can detect the log-forging
attacks from malicious clients and server, but also mitigate those attacks (§ 4).
3.New attacks: This work presents new security attacks against Blockchain-based log-
auditing protocols. These new attacks exploits the limits in real Blockchain systems (e.g.,
write unavailability, Blockchain forks, contract race conditions). We propose to harden the
security of ContractChecker under these proposed new attacks and conduct an extensive
security analysis (§ 5).
4. Prototyping and evaluation: We implement a prototype of the ContractChecker on
Ethereum/Solidity. By experiments on private and public Ethereum testnets, we extensively
evaluate the client-side cost of the ContractChecker. The result shows the ContractChecker
can scale to hundreds of clients and, in this setting, save client costs by more than one
order of magnitude when compared with existing client-based log auditing works including
Catena. The evaluation on client cost justifies the key design choice in ContractChecker to
delegate log auditing to Blockchain (§ 6).
2 Preliminary: Secure Consistency Verification Protocols
Suppose there are multiple clients interacting with an untrusted data-storage service. The
problem of storage consistency verification is to convince all the clients that the untrusted
storage service conforms to a certain storage consistency model. In the existing literature
(as will be elaborated on), verifying storage consistency entails two steps: storage log at-
testation and log auditing. In log attestation, a conceptual trusted party (log attester) makes
attestation about the collection of all storage operations and their ordering. The purpose
of log attestation is to commit to a globally consistent view about the operation ordering
such that the malicious server cannot “fork” different views for different clients (i.e., the
forking attack [18]). After a fork-free global log is established, the second step can take
place which is to audit the log and check the consistency conditions over the global log of
operations.
Existing work specializes the above framework. Specifically, SUNDR [17] does not
assume a trusted third party (i.e., no trusted attester) but instead relies on the untrusted
server making log attestations to individual clients. Without the trusted attester, SUNDR
does not prevent forking attacks, but makes them eventually detectable (i.e., the so-called
level of fork consistency [17]). In a sense, SUNDR is a fork-detectable log attestation
scheme without trusted third party. Caelus [16] addresses the application scenario with
battery-powered clients of a cloud storage service. Caelus rotates (or time-shares) the role
of log attester among personal devices to present a virtual and highly-available trusted
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attester. Log auditing occurs on individual clients and Caelus supports the checking of both
strong and weak consistency models. Similarly, CloudProof [20] requires the untrusted
server to attest to the operation log and relies on the trusted clients to audit the operation
history for a variety of consistency models. Catena [23] is a unique Blockchain-based log
attestation scheme, which prevents the server-forking attack by “abusing” the Blockchain
security in no double-spending transactions.
All existing consistency-verification schemes including the above rely on trusted clients
(or data owners) to audit the operation log and check consistency conditions. In this re-
spect, ContractChecker is the first scheme that delegates log auditing to the Blockchain.
The unique design of ContractChecker is depicted in Table 1. Blockchain-oriented log del-
egation brings benefits in lower client cost and availability requirements as will be elabo-
rated in § 4.1.
Table 1: Distinction of the ContractChecker design: ✗ means the log operation is not sup-
ported by Blockchain, but instead by clients.
Solutions Attestation Auditing
by Blockchain by Blockchain
SUNDR [17], Caelus [16], CloudProof [20] ✗ ✗
Catena [23] ✓ ✗
ContractChecker ✓ ✓
3 Research Formulation
3.1 Target Applications
The target application scenarios of ContractChecker are characterized by the following
properties: S1) The clients are of limited capability in computing, storage, and availability.
This motivates them to outsource data storage to a more powerful cloud. S2) Violating
storage consistency leads to security consequences. S3) The data load is low (e.g., typically
lower than tens of operations per second). In particular, the low throughput properties of
these typical application scenarios make it amenable for the use of Blockchain, which is
known to have limited throughput in ingesting transactions.
In real world, there are many application scenarios that fit the above paradigm. As
an example, consider a DockerHub [3] style container registry which distributes software
patches for mobile apps. In this scenario, the clients are low-power smart phones (S1).
Distributing a stale software image with unfixed security bugs leads to vulnerability on
users’ phone (S2). In terms of workloads, an IBM report [11] shows that among seven geo-
distributed registry deployments, the busiest one serves only 100 requests per minute for
more than 80% of time(S3). We believe there are many real-world applications that meet
our target scenarios, ranging from Google’s certificate-transparency logs [2], iCloud style
personal-device synchronization [8], Github-hosted secure software development [24,7],
etc.
3.2 System and Security Model
Our system model consists of three parties: a storage server in the cloud, multiple con-
current clients and the Blockchain. Clients submit storage operations (i.e., data reads and
writes) to the storage server. The operations are witnessed by the Blockchain via our Con-
tractChecker protocol.
4
Clients Clients are data owners who outsource the data storage to the cloud. They submit
operations to the cloud storage to read or update their data. Different clients’ operations
may occur concurrently, that is, the cloud service may process multiple operations in par-
allel, with their time intervals overlapped. A client can be active when she has submitted
operations recently (we will explain the definition of active clients later) and inactive when
she goes offline without any operations on the cloud.
Clients in our model are stateless in the sense that a client does not persist state across
active sessions. That is, a client does not need to remember her past operations when she
is engaged with a cloud. In addition, among clients, there are no direct communication
channels. That is, other than the cloud or Blockchain, clients do not communicate out-of-
band. We believe this model reflects low-power clients in many real-world situations, such
as smart-phone clients running web browsers. Web clients are stateless and do not directly
communicate among themselves.
We assume each ContractChecker client is identified, say by her public key. When
the Blockchain needs to identify a client, the client identity can be obtained and verified
using client certificates issued by an offline trusted certificate authority (CA). Existing key-
transparency systems such as CONIKS [19] can be used here in companion with Con-
tractChecker. More details about client identity management are described in Technical
Report [9].
We assume clients share synchronized clocks by running NTP protocols. Synchronized
clocks will be useful in our protocol when clients are required to log operations. The ac-
curacy of NTP protocols may affect the precision of our consistency verification results.
Existing protocols can achieve highly synchronized clocks and limit clock skews to the
level of milliseconds [14], which we believe are sufficient in our system.
A Cloud Storage Service The cloud service hosts a data store shared among multiple
clients. The service accepts clients’ requests and processes them concurrently. That is, dif-
ferent operations from clients may be processed in parallel and in an out-of-order fashion.
Under this execution model, we consider strong consistency or linearizability [15]. Lin-
earizability considers independent access to different data records and is sufficiently strong
to capture necessary conditions in many security scenarios [16,20]. Weaker consistency
that is widely adopted in modern cloud services [21] is commonly less relevant to security-
sensitive and critical applications. In this paper, we do not consider database serializability
or isolation under multiple keys [12].
We assume the cloud service makes a consistency-centric service-level agreement
(SLA) [22] with the clients which states where the cloud service promises to guarantee
strong consistency (more specifically, linearizability as will be defined next) over the op-
erations it will serve. An honest server will enforce the promised consistency conditions
during operational hours.
A malicious storage server will violate the consistency conditions (as will be elaborated
on), by returning a stale result for a read. In addition, a malicious server will not follow our
ContractChecker protocol and tries to conceal the operation inconsistency from clients.
Consistency violation, if left undetected, can lead to severe security consequences such as
impersonation attacks (recall § 3.1).
Moreover, we assume the cloud service is rational. While a malicious cloud server
may forge operations to make an inconsistent operation history look like consistent (i.e.,
concealing the inconsistency), the server will not attempt to make a consistent operation
history look like inconsistent. We believe this assumption reflects practical situations with
SLA where the cloud server will be charged in case of verified inconsistency, and thus does
not have the incentive to forge an inconsistent history.
Consistency definition: We consider the storage service exposes a standard key-value
API, where each data record is a key-value pair and each storage operation accesses the
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target record by the data key. A storage operation, be it a read or write, is specified by
two timestamps, which respectively represent 1) the begin time when the request of the
operation is sent by the client, and 2) the end time when the response of the operation is
received by the client. Formally, given a key-value pair 〈K,V 〉, a read operation is V =
r[tb,te](K) and ACK = w[tb,te](K,V ). Here r/w denotes read or write operation. tb < te
and they are the begin and end timestamps. If two operations are concurrent, their time
intervals [tb, te] may overlap.
An operation history is linearizable if the following two conditions are met: 1) All
operations can be mapped to a total-order sequence that is compatible with the real-time
intervals of the operations. 2) There is no stale read on the total-order sequence. That is,
any read operation should return the record that is fresh on the total-order. This property is
also called read freshness.
Any linearizable operation history can be represented by a totally-ordered opera-
tion sequence. We denote an operation sequence by operation indices. For instance, in
w1w2r3[w2], the subscription is the operation index in the total-order (described below).
Linearizability specifies operations of the same data key; for simplicity, we omit data key
in this notation. The square bracket of a read indicates the result record. r3[w2] denotes a
read operation ordered as the third operation in the total-order sequence and which returns
the record written by write w2.
Network: In this work, we assume a reliable network among clients, the server and
Blockchain nodes.When one party sends a message to the network, the networkwill deliver
the message to the receiver with negligible delay (comparing with the period our protocol
runs). We do not consider network faults or partition in this work.
Blockchain The Blockchain in our protocol is a public, permissionless Blockchain running
over a large P2P network and supporting smart contract execution. Real-world examples
include Ethereum and the latest version of Bitcoin. In this setting, we assume the hon-
est majority among Blockchain miners. We believe this is a reasonable assumption as in
practice there are no successful 51% attacks on Bitcoin or Ethereum.
The Blockchain in our protocol is parameterized by the following arguments: block
timeB, which is the average time to find a block in a Blockchain; and transaction-validation
delay P , which is the time between a pending transaction enters the memory pool and when
it leaves for transaction validation; and finality delay F , which is the number of blocks
needed to be appended after a finalized transaction. That is, a transaction is considered to
be finalized in Blockchain when there are at least F blocks included in the Blockchain after
the transaction.
The Blockchain supports the execution of smart contracts. The contract is executed
across all Blockchain miners. It guarantees the execution integrity and non-stoppability.
That is, the Blockchain truthfully executes a smart contract based on the provided argu-
ments, despite of the attacks to subvert the Blockchain (as described below). Once the
execution of a contract starts, it is hard to stop the execution or to abort.
Blockchain write availability: The Blockchain may drop transactions based on its
current load and transaction fee. A transaction with a higher fee will have a lower chance
of being dropped [23] and have shorter latency to be included. This assumption will be
tested in our evaluation.
Blockchain attacks: The Blockchain is subject to a series of threats. In this work,
we focus on practical Blockchain threats and exclude theoretic threats (e.g., 51% attacks,
selfish mining, etc.) and off-chain threats (e.g., stealing wallet coins and secret keys). 1) The
Blockchainmay be forked permanently due to software update as in the case of Bitcoin cash
(Blockchain forks). 2) Smart contracts may contain security bugs that can be exploited by a
vector of attacks [6], such as reentrancy attacks, buffer overflow attacks, etc. In practice, the
DAO (decentralized autonomous organization) incidents are caused by this attack vector.
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3.3 Goals
Security Goals In our system, there are two main threats: 1) In the case that inconsistency
occurs, the malicious server wants to hide the inconsistency from victim clients. 2) In the
case that all operations are consistent, a malicious client may want to accuse the benign
server of the storage inconsistency that does not occur. We exclude other cases as they are
not rational. For instance, we do not consider that a rational server will forge operations
such that a consistent operation history will appear inconsistent. We also do not consider
that a victim client will want to hide an inconsistent operation history. Due to this reason,
we assume clients and the server will not collude to either hide inconsistency or accuse of
false consistency.
Our security goals are listed below:
Timely detection of inconsistency against malicious server: A malicious server can-
not hide the occurrence of inconsistent operations from victim clients. To be concrete, when
inconsistency occurs, the protocol will assert there are inconsistent operations in a timely
manner, even when a malicious server can forge a seemingly consistent log. In addition to
that, the protocol will present a verifiable proof of the inconsistency, so that it can penalize
the cloud service for violating the consistency.
No false accusation of inconsistency against malicious clients: A malicious client
cannot falsely accuse a benign server of inconsistency that does not occur. Given a consis-
tent operation history, the protocol will assert it is consistent, even when there are malicious
clients who want to forge inconsistent operations in the log.
Cost Goals Client cost: Clients in our protocol can remain stateless. That is, running the
ContractChecker protocol, a client does not need to store her operations indefinitely and
can truncate operations after use (i.e., stateless). In addition, the protocol data stored on a
client is limited to the client’s local operation; a client does not need to store other clients’
operations (i.e., local operations). These two requirements make clients lightweight and
render the protocol applicable to scenarios with low-power clients.
Non-goals Data authenticity: Data authenticity states a malicious cloud service cannot
forge a client’s data without being detected. We assume an external infrastructure in place
that ensures data authenticity, such as MAC or digital signatures. To be more specific, the
client who writes a record signs the record, and the signature can be verified to guarantee
the data authenticity of the record. Here, clients’ public keys are securely distributed by a
PKI or a secure communication channel.
Collusion: In ContractChecker, we aim at security guarantees against a malicious cloud
server or malicious clients. However, we do not consider the case that a server colludes a
client, because this would make it impossible for any third-party to detect the attack. To
be concrete, a colluding client can lie about her log (e.g., omitting an operation), and the
server can do the same. With the client and server both lying about their operations, any
third-party cannot detect the existence of the lie. If an operation can be forged or omitted in
a log, the consistency assertion over the log cannot be trusted. For instance, omitting w2 in
w1w2r3[w1] leads to incorrect consistency assertion. Due to this reason, we exclude from
our threat model the collusion among clients and server. In practice, we believe server-client
collusion is a rare situation.
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4 The Security Protocols
4.1 Design Motivation
The key design in ContractChecker is to use Blockchain to audit the log in a client-server
system (recall Table 1). This use of Blockchain is motivated by our observations below:
1) Low client cost: By delegating log audit to the Blockchain, one can significantly
relieve the burden from the clients. Existing consistency-verification protocols are based
on client-side log auditing [23,25], which requires a client to persist not only her own
operations but also operations of all other clients, limiting the system scalability. By dele-
gating log auditing to the Blockchain, a client can be relieved from accessing other clients’
operations, and can have a minimal overhead of receiving log-auditing results from the
Blockchain.
2) Freshness with stateless clients: Consistency verification needs to access historical
operations.With stateless clients who do not communicate, it is impossible to guarantee the
freshness of any global state without trusted third party [17,18]. The presence of Blockchain
as a trusted third party is necessary and beneficial in guaranteeing the freshness of serving
historical operations in the presence of server rollback attack.
3) Security without client availability: Intuitively, Blockchain serves as a highly avail-
able1 trusted third party, and it can be used to support clients with low availability. More
specifically, in existing client-based auditing schemes, all clients are assumed to be highly
available in the sense that they require inactive clients to participate in log auditing in ev-
ery epoch. In a world without a highly available third-party, this requirement is necessary
because otherwise it is hard to distinguish an inactive client who does not report (the be-
nign case), and an active client whose report is suppressed by the malicious server (the
attack case). With a Blockchain serving as a reliable broadcast channel among clients,2 it
can afford that an inactive client does not need to participate in the protocol execution. The
reliable Blockchain makes it possible to collect all active clients’ logs in the presence of
untrusted server. (See § 5.1 for a detailed correctness analysis)
In the following, we first present the protocol overview and then justify the design by
describing the alternative designs we have explored (and dismissed). After that, we will
present the details of our protocol execution.
4.2 Protocol Overview
ContractChecker is a protocol that runs among clients, a storage server and the Blockchain.
The purpose of the protocol is to present a trustworthy assertion about the consistency of
the operations among clients and the server. At a high level, the protocol works by asking
clients and the server to periodically attest to their views of operations to the Blockchain
where different views are crosschecked and consistency conditions are verified. The pur-
pose of the crosscheck on Blockchain is to detect and mitigate the attack from a malicious
server (or client) who forges her view of the log.
In our protocol, the interaction between the Blockchain and the clients/server off chain
can be described by the following three functions. Note that the protocol runs in epochs
and here we consider the operations in one epoch.
1 The condition that Blockchain is highly available is described in § 3.2.
2 There are situations that consistency verification protocols require client-client communication,
such as disseminating the global list of operations for client-based auditing and reporting attack
incidents.
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– S.attestServerLog(OpsS , skS): Server S declares a total-order over the global
history of operations in the current epoch (OpsS). She attests to the declared total-order
sequence by signing it with her secret key skS .
– C.attestClientLog(OpsC , skC): An active client C attests to her local opera-
tions in the current epoch (OpsC ) by signing it with her secret key skC . Operations
of a single client can also be concurrent and a client does not need to declare a total-
order over her own operations. If a client is inactive, meaning she did not submit any
operation in the epoch, she does not need to call this function.
– C.consistencyResult() = {Y,N}: A client C can check consistency of the
current operation history. With Blockchain, the checking result is only valid when
the attestations are finalized on the chain. This function is blocking until the fi-
nality is confirmed. If the attestations are not finalized, it will retry by calling
attestClientLog.
4.3 Protocol Design Alternatives
No server attestation: Our protocol (as presented above) requires to collect the log from
both clients and the server. An alternative design is to collect the operation history only
from clients. In this scheme, all clients send their local operations to the Blockchain with-
out collecting the server log. The union of client logs can reconstruct all operations and
their relations in real time (i.e., serial or concurrent with each other). However, there are
two limits of this approach. First, the union of client logs does not have the total-order
information (among concurrent operations) which is necessary to determine the storage
consistency (Recall the consistency definition in § 3.2). Relying on the smart contracts to
“solve” the operation total-order, it would be expensive in terms of gas cost. Second, hav-
ing attestations from both clients and server is helpful to determine which party is lying
in the presence of malicious client and server. In particular, without the server attestation,
it would be impossible to mitigate attacks from malicious clients. Therefore, our protocol
requires the (untrusted) server to declare the operation total-order and send her attestation
to the Blockchain.
Synchronizing public contract functions: Our protocol implements log attestation
as public contract functions (i.e., attestServerLog(), attestClientLog())
and implements the log crosschecking and auditing as private contract functions (i.e.,
crosscheckLog()). Our initial design is to implement all three tasks in three public
contract functions that can be called from off-chain clients.
However, a problem arises with the order in which these public functions can be exe-
cuted. The order in which the calls to public contract functions are issued (issuance order)
may be different from the order in which the public contract functions are executed on
Blockchain miners (execution order). For instance, if a Blockchain client can serially sub-
mit functions calls for log attestation, crosscheck and checking, the three functions may be
delivered to individual Blockchain miners in a different order, say checking, crosscheck,
attestation, which will break the protocol correctness. To fix this, one can rely on clients to
synchronize different contract calls, say by requiring a client only calls crosscheck until it
confirms the completion (or transaction finality) of the call of log attestation. However, this
client-side synchronization is extremely slow and unnecessarily time-consuming.
Therefore, our protocol implements the log crosschecking and auditing by private con-
tract functions that can only be called by another contract on chain. By this means, the
serial order is ensured directly by individual miners without expensive client-side finality
confirmation.
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4.4 The Protocol: Execution and Construction
In this section, we present the protocol in the top-down fashion. We first describe the over-
all protocol execution flow involving both on-chain and off-chain parties. We then describe
the construction of the protocol with the details of the various primitives used in the con-
struction..
Overall Protocol Execution We present the overall protocol execution. The Con-
tractChecker protocol runs in epochs. Each epoch is of a pre-defined time interval E.
During an epoch, clients send read/write requests to the storage server in the cloud. For
simplicity, we consider a client runs a single thread.3 The operations are logged on both
sides of clients and the server as in Figure 2). A client logs her own operations while the
server logs the operations submitted by all clients. Given an operation, a client logs the
start time when the request for the operation is sent and the end time when the response of
the operation is received. We assume the NTP protocol in place enables all clients to log
operation time with low inaccuracy. Both clients and the server store the logged operations
locally.
At the end of the epoch, both clients and the server attest to their operation log. The
server calls attestServerLog(ops server,skS) where she declares a total-order
sequence over the operations and signs the log with server key skS before sending it the
Blockchain. A client calls attestClientLog(ops client, skC) where she signs
the logged operations with secret key skC and sends it to the Blockchain. The total-order in
the server attestation is necessary for consistency checking (recall the definition in § 3.2).
The smart contract running on the Blockchain receives the calls
of attestServerLog(ops server,skS) from the server and
attestClientLog(ops client, skC) from all active clients. After that, it
runs log verification, log crosschecking and log auditing which will be elaborated on in
§ 4.4. The result, namely the assertion of log consistency, is stored on chain for future
inquiry. Clients can call consistencyResult() to check the consistency result.
The consistency assertion is valid only when two conditions are met: 1) all ac-
tive clients’ transactions attestClientLog(ops client, skC) are finalized on
Blockchain. 2) the consistency assertion (i.e., the result of running auditLog()) is fi-
nalized on Blockchain. To guarantee the two conditions, all active clients in an epoch are
synchronized among themselves and with the Blockchain (see § 4.4 for details).
ContractChecker is parameterized by the duration of an epoch E, which can be set ac-
cording to application-level requirements in timeliness of consistency assurance (see details
in our technical report [9]).
An example is presented in Figure 1 where the ContractChecker protocol runs one
epoch between two clients C1 and C2. An epoch can be set to multiple of Blockchain’s
block time. On Ethereum, it is multiply of 15 seconds. During the epoch, client C1
submits two operations to the server, namely w1 and r3[w1]. r3[w1] represents a read
operation that returns write w1. Client C2 submits an operation w2 to the server. All
operations are on the same data key, and they are processed by the server in the se-
rial order of w1w2r3[w1]. By the end of epoch, it first runs log attestation: C1 calls
attestClientLog(w1, r3) and C2 calls attestClientLog(w2). The server de-
clares a total-order w1, w2, r3 by calling attestServerLog(w1, w2, r3). The smart
contract then stores the two client logs and one server log on the Blockchain. Af-
ter that, it runs two functions: crosscheckLog({w1, r3}, {w2}, {w1, w2, r3}), and
3 In practice, the case of a multi-threaded client can be treated as multiple single-threaded virtual
clients.
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Fig. 1: Running ContractChecker: An example scenario with two clients. Client C1 sends a
write w1 before a read r3[w1] that returns the record written by w1. Client C2 sends a write
w2 to the server.
auditLog({w1, w2, r3[w1]}). As a result, the smart contract asserts the log is inconsistent
and stores it on chain.
Meanwhile, the clients may call C.consistencyResult(). The function call will
block until the transaction of C.attestClientLog() is finalized on Blockchain. On
Ethereum, it takes 25 epochs to finalize a transaction. After 25 epochs, if the transaction is
finalized, the consistency assertion stored on chain can be treated as an immutable state-
ment and be further used by applications. In addition, the client can truncate her local
operations in that epoch. If the transaction is not included in the Blockchain, the client will
retry C.attestClientLog().
Now we modify the setting of this example that w1 and w2 are processed concurrently
by the server (i.e., with overlapped time intervals). In this case, a rational server (recall
§ 3.2) will search and attest to the total-order that is consistent, namely w2w1r3[w1]. Note
that the other total-orderw1w2r3[w1] also matches the real-time relation, as w1 and w2 are
concurrent. But it contains inconsistent read r3[w1].
Note that in this example, the ContractChecker clients are stateless (in that client C1
can discard operations w1r3 and truncate the log after client attestation) and store only
local operations (in that client C1 does not need to store the operations of client C2). This
saves the client cost, comparing all existing approaches including Catena and Caelus which
require clients to maintain global state without log truncation.
Construction of On-chain Contracts The two attestations described in § 4.2 in-
voke a smart-contract on chain. The smart contract taking as input of log attestations
from the server and clients will conduct four operations: verifying client attestations
(verifyClientLog()), verifying the server attestation (verifyServerLog()),
crosschecking the logs of clients and server (crosscheckLog()), and auditing the
checked log to assert consistency (auditLog()).
In verifyClientLog(), the contract would verify the client attestation using the
client’s public key. In verifyServerLog(), the contract verifies the server attestation
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1 contract ContractChecker{
2 address payable ownerContract;
3 attestClientLog(Op[] ops_client, signature_client){
4 if(true == verifyClientLog(ops_client,
5 signature_client, pubkey_client)){
6 lock.acquire();//to prevent race conditions
7 if(++attested_clients == N
8 && attested_server = 1){
9 if(!crosscheckLog(ops_clients, ops_server))
10 throw;
11 if(!auditLog(ops_server)) throw;
12 }
13 lock.release();
14 }
15 }
16
17 attestServerLog(Op[] ops_server, signature_server){
18 if(true == verifyServerLog(ops_server, signature_server, pubkey_server)){
19 lock.acquire();//to prevent race conditions
20 if(attested_clients == N
21 && ++ attested_server = 1){
22 if(!crosscheckLog(ops_clients, ops_server))
23 throw;
24 if(!auditLog(ops_server)) throw;
25 }
26 lock.release();
27 }
28 }
29
30 modifier crosscheckLog(Op[] ops_clients, Op[] ops_server)) returns (false) {...}
31 modifier auditLog(Op[] ops_server)) returns (false) {...}
32 mapping ops_server;
33 mapping ops_clients;
34 }
Fig. 2: Smart-contract program of ContractChecker
using the server’s public key. It is optional that an individual operation can be signed by
both the client and server. In this case, both verification functions will verify individual
operations as well using both clients’ and server’s public keys. Once logs are verified, the
client logs are union-ed and are crosschecked with the server log to find any inequality
(crosscheckLog()). Once the logs are successfully cross-checked, it runs log auditing
(i.e., auditLog()) where strong consistency conditions (e.g., operation ordering and
read freshness) are checked over the crosschecked server log.
Finality of Client Attestations The finality checking is realized by all active clients stay-
ing online and confirming the finality of their own attestations. For a client to check the
finality of her attestation, she simply checks if there are F blocks on the Blockchain that
are ordered after the block where her attestation transaction is stored. Blockchain’s im-
mutability guarantees the hardness of altering or omitting the client attestation if its finality
is confirmed on the chain. If the transaction is not finalized, the client is responsible for
resubmitting attestClientLog() until the confirmed finality of the transaction.
A consistency assertion is only valid when all active clients have confirmed the finality
of their log attestations. Had one client’s log not been confirmed on the Blockchain, a
malicious server can launch the selective-omission attack (detailed in § 5.3) that leads to
an incorrect assertion. Clients wait until all clients’ attestations are finalized on Blockchain
(see § 5.3 for a heuristic client-synchronization scheme).
12
5 Protocol Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze the protocol correctness under both benign and malicious
settings. We start with the correctness with benign clients and the server. We consider the
case of lowly-available clients. We then focus on the malicious cases, by analyzing protocol
security with a malicious server, malicious clients, and unreliable Blockchain.
5.1 Correctness
In ContractChecker, the protocol correctness states that if the protocol is truthfully
executed by benign clients and server, a consistent operation history will be as-
serted as a consistent history, and an inconsistent operation history will be asserted as
an inconsistent history. Informally, given any consistent operation history OpsS and
any {OpsC} with ∪OpsC = OpsS , it holds that S.attestServerLog(OpsS),
C.attestClientLog(OpsC), C.consistencyResult() = Y . For any incon-
sistency operation history OpsS and any {OpsC}, S.attestServerLog(OpsS),
C.attestClientLog(OpsC), C.consistencyResult() = N .
Analyzing the protocol correctness is straightforward. If the clients and server are be-
nign, the protocol guarantees the authentic copies of client logs and server log are send to
the Blockchain as the input of crosscheckLog() and auditLog(). The computation
logic guarantees that a server log with consistency total-order will be asserted as consis-
tency. For an inconsistency log, the server cannot find a total-order without inconsistency
and the case of inconsistency will be detected by auditLog().
Correctness with low client availability: In ContractChecker, we consider active
clients and inactive clients: Given an epoch, an active client is one that has submitted at
least one operation to the cloud. Otherwise, it is an inactive client. ContractChecker re-
quires only active clients in an epoch to be available to participate in the protocol by the
end of the epoch. Be more precise, given an inactive client, it does not require its availability
for protocol participation.
The protocol correctness without the availability of inactive clients is straightforward.
Whether inactive clients send their empty log to the Blockchain, it does not affect either
the union of all client operations or the log crosscheck (crosscheckLog()). Therefore,
an attack is detected by the server-client log inequality, which is irrelevant to the inactive
clients’ empty logs.
This is in contrast with existing client-based protocols which require the availability of
both active and inactive clients. Briefly, the reason that ContractChecker does not require
availability of inactive clients while other protocols do is that it cannot distinguish the
benign case of an inactive client who is legitimately unavailable from the malicious case of
an active client who detects an attack but whose attack report is suppressed by the untrusted
server who relays the report among clients. In ContractChecker, it does not rely on the
untrusted server to report the case of an attack, but instead by the trusted Blockchain.
5.2 Security under Server/Client Attacks
In this subsection, we consider the attacks launched by individual malicious clients or
server. As reasoned before, our threat model excludes the collusion between a client and
server. We leave the Blockchain exploits to the next subsection.
In our threat model, either a client or the server can forge her attestation to the
Blockchain. Specifically, she can forge a non-existing operation (A1), omit a valid oper-
ation (A2), replays a valid operation multiple times (A3), reorders the serially-executed
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operations (A4). Recall that our system model considers a rational server who, given con-
current and consistent operations, will not declare a total-order to make it look like an
inconsistent log.
A malicious server can exploit the operation forging (A1-A4) to conceal an inconsistent
log and to avoid paying the penalty to victim clients. For instance, successfully omitting
w2 in w1w2r3[w1] may fool the ContractChecker to falsely assert the operation history to
be consistent. A malicious client may exploit the operation forging (A1-A4) to forge an
inconsistent log and to falsely accuse a benign cloud. For instance, a client can forge an
operation (A1) w2.5 in a consistent log w1w2r3[w2] to make it look like inconsistent.
ContractChecker can detect any operation forging (A1, A2) by a mismatch between
server attestation and client attestation (in crosscheckLog()). Without server-client
collusion, if one party, say the server, forge an operation in the server attestation, the
forged/omitted operation will be found in the server/client attestation, but not in the clien-
t/server attestation. The replay attack (A3) can be detected by multiple identical operations
in the server/client log. Reordered operations (A4) can be detected by the condition that
the operation order does not match the real-time order (i.e., an operation that occurs later
is ordered before an earlier operation).
Security hardening for attack mitigation: ContractChecker is security-hardened to
not only detect attacks but also mitigate these attacks. Mitigating the attacks requires at-
tributing an attack to the correct cause and to recover the system from the attack for further
processing. The fundamental challenge in the attack attribution is about distinguishing the
cause of inconsistency between a malicious client logging a forged operation or a malicious
server omitting a valid operation.
To support attack attribution and to overcome this fundamental challenge, we require
each online storage operation, when it is being served, needs to be witnessed and doubly
signed by both the server and the submitting client. The double signatures can establish a
ground truth to distinguish the cause of attacks at the consistency-checking time. For in-
stance, if a doubly-signed operation is found in the server attestation but not in any client
attestation, then it is attributed to a malicious client omitting her operation. If a doubly-
signed operation is found in a client attestation but not in a server attestation, it is attributed
to a malicious server omitting her operation. Note that a malicious client forging an oper-
ation can not get away as the forged operation can not be signed by the server. Also note
that we don’t consider the case of server-client collision, which presents an impossibility
result for attack detection.
By this means, the ContractChecker can distinguish the cause of different attacks (i.e.,
A1, A2, A3 or A4) and can recover the system from attestation forging. The details of the
attack mitigation are presented in Technical Report [9].
5.3 Security under Blockchain Exploits
Exploiting BlockchainWrite Unavailability Recall that the practical Blockchain systems
exhibit low write availability, and may drop valid transactions. Given a faulty Blockchain
like this, a malicious server can selectively omit operations in her attestation such that
dropped transactions of client attestations correspond to the omitted operations in the server
attestation. By this means, the server can omit operations without being detected by Con-
tractChecker, in a way to conceal inconsistency. For instance, in Figure 1, Client C2’s call
of attestClientLog(w2) can be dropped by the Blockchain. The malicious server,
observing w2 is not included in the Blockchain, can selectively omit the operation in her
attestation. This will allow the forged log (with omitted operations) to pass the log cross-
checking (more specifically, crosscheckLog({w1, r3[w1]},{w1, r3[w1]}), which fur-
ther tricks the ContractChecker to assert incorrectly that the operation history (which is ac-
tuallyw1, w2, r3[w1]) is consistent. Because in this attack, the server selectively omit opera-
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tions based on dropped transactions in Blockchain, we call this attack by selective-omission
attack.
Security hardening against Blockchain unavailability: The selective-omission attack
can be prevented if the finality of any client’s log attestation in Blockchain can be assured
of. To prevent the miss of a transaction on Blockchain, a common paradigm is to resubmit
the transactions. A naive resubmission policy is to resubmit every F block until the trans-
action is finalized. With this naive policy, it may lead to an unwanted situation where the
resubmitted transaction keeps being declined (e.g., due to low transaction fee).
Enforcing a time bound on transaction finality is crucial to the security of Con-
tractChecker. That is, ContractChecker’s security relies on whether a transaction (after
resubmission) can be guarantee to succeed before a pre-scribed timeout. Because if both
clients and Blockchain are allowed to be unavailable in an arbitrarily long time, it is im-
possible to distinguish between the benign case of an inactive client where the client does
not send a transaction and the malicious case of an unavailable Blockchain under selective-
omission attacks.
Therefore, our security hardening technique is to enforce a time bound on the trans-
action finality. Instead of resubmitting transactions, we require high transaction fee (e.g.,
based on a heuristic, 20 · 109 Wei in Ethereum transactions) and increase the chance of
transaction being accepted in the first place namely in F blocks. The higher transaction fee
is, the more likely a transaction is being accepted to be included in the Blockchain. The
relationship between Blockchain write availability and transaction fee is evaluated in our
technical report [9] With the high transaction fee, all clients wait for F blocks after their
transactions.
Analysis of attack prevention: If all active ContractChecker clients execute the trans-
action resubmission policy, the selective-omission attack can be prevented. What fol-
lows is the security analysis: Assume the resubmission policy can guarantee the high
chance (the evaluation is in our technical report [9]) that all clients’ transactions (for
attestClientLog()) are included in the Blockchain before the timeout of F blocks.
The selective-omission attack cannot succeed because any valid operation can be found in
the client log attestations and the omission of the operation in the attack can be detected
by the mismatch in log crosschecking. In the previous example, by the time w2 is included
in the Blockchain (before F blocks), the ContractChecker can detect the w2 is absent in
the server log as it appears in Client C2’s log. The ContractChecker can identify the attack,
recover the server log for making a correct assertion about the operation inconsistency.
Forking Attacks Preliminary on forking attacks: Consider multiple clients share a state
hosted on a server. In this setup, a forking attacker is a malicious server who forks the shared
state and serves different clients with different (forked) states. In client-based consistency
protocols (e.g., Catena and Caelus), the malicious server may fork her log attestations for
different auditing clients, such that the forked global logs appear to be consistent from
different clients’ local views.
In ContractChecker, both clients and server send their attestations to the Blockchain
where the crosschecking occurs. The regular forking attack where the server forks her view
among clients may not succeed because the Blockchain essentially provides a “gossiping”
channel among clients and miners. However, Blockchain provides only an imperfect gos-
siping channel and there are exploits one can leverage to break the gossiping channel.
The central idea here is that the server can fork the inputs to the crosscheckLog()
function in smart contract so that the function instances running on different miners take
forked inputs (from the server and clients) and falsely accept separately. The forking can
be facilitated by exploits such as smart contract races and Blockchain forks.
Exploiting Blockchain forks, the server log is forked by the malicious server and the
logs of different clients may be forked due to network partitions. This could effectively
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lead to a forking attack. Concretely, when the network partition separates the Blockchain
network and clients into different partitions and the server is in a position to mount the
forking attack and to send different partitions different server views. For instance, consider
the server wants to hide a “total-order anomaly” sequence w1|w2, r3[w1]|r4[w2] where
w1 and w2 are concurrent, r3 and r4 are concurrent, and the four operations are submitted
from four different clients (respectivelyC1, C2, C3, C4). The network partitions clients and
Blockchain at the attestation time to two partitions, say P1 and P2, where in P1 clients C1
and C3 attest to w1 and r3 to the Blockchain, and in P2 clients C2 and C4 attest to w2 and
r4 to the Blockchain. Then, the server is in a position to launch a forking attack by sending
a view of server log (w2w1r3[w1]) to Blockchain partition P1 and another (forked) view of
server log (w1w2r4[w2]) to Blockchain partition P2. Because the client attestations are also
forked due to network partition, the smart contracts of ContractChecker running in both P1
and P2 will (falsely) accept.
To make this attack successful, the key is the Blockchain fork due to the network parti-
tion. In practice, however, this type of Blockchain fork is temporary and is resolved when
the network reconnects. When the network reconnects, one of the Blockchain forks will
be orphaned, which will leave some client attestation omitted eventually. For instance, if
the fork in P1 is chosen and that in P2 is orphaned, the client attestations from C2 and C4
can be permanently lost. In our scheme, this attack is detected by our client-side technique
(§ 5.3) which will check the finality of transactions after sufficient time.
For other types of Blockchain forks, such as caused by software updates, forking attacks
cannot succeed. Because client attestations are not separated, all Blockchain forks will
receive the same set of attestations of all clients. To hide an inconsistent anomaly (e.g., stale
read), it would require the fresh write operation to be omitted in the Blockchain, which is
impossible in the presence of all client attestations. Note that by forking the total-order
declaration, it is not sufficient to hide inconsistency anomaly.
Exploiting smart-contract races, the forking server attempts to update the
server log in the middle of function execution of crosscheckLog() by ex-
ploiting race conditions. The goal is to make client logs cross-checked with dif-
ferent (forked) versions of server log. Concretely, consider the function-call se-
quence S.serverAttestLog(w1, w2, r3[w1]), C1.clientAttestLog(w2),
C2.clientAttestLog(w1, r3[w1]), S.serverAttestLog(w2, w1, r3[w1]).
Suppose before S.serverAttestLog(w2, w1, r3[w1]) runs, the contract already
enters crosscheckLog() where the server log w1, w2, r3[w1] is being crosschecked
with client logsw2 andw1, r3[w1]. When S.serverAttestLog(w2, w1, r3[w1]) runs,
it might happen that the call of S.serverAttestLog(w2, w1, r3[w1]) replaces the
variable of ops server during crosscheckLog(). This may lead to the unwanted
situation that client log w2 is crosschecked with one version of server log w1, w2, r3[w1],
and client logw1, r3[w1] is crosschecked with another version of server log w2, w1, r3[w1].
In this situation, server log w2, w1, r3[w1] will survive as the successfully crosschecked
version, which will lead to an incorrect consistency.We call this attack by forking-by-races
attack.
The ContractChecker prevents the forking-by-races attack by synchronizing the crit-
ical functions and avoiding concurrency. Concretely, in ContractChecker, we define a
critical section around the functions crosscheckLog() and auditLog(), such that
the execution of these two victim functions needs to be serialized with other func-
tions. To be more specific, in the forking-by-races attack, the attacker (i.e., calling func-
tion S.serverAttestLog(w2, w1, r3[w1])) and the victim (i.e., running function
crosscheckLog()) are forced to execute in a serial order.Without concurrent execution
of attacking and victim functions, the attack cannot succeed.
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5.4 Incentivize DoS Attacks
DoS attacks: With the policy of high transaction fee, it is tempting to design the following
DoS attack: An attacker can 1) join the Blockchain network as an honest miner who mines
and executes the smart contract to collect transaction fee, and 2) join the ContractChecker
protocol as a client to send transactions and run DoS attacks. The rationale behind the
attack is that the attacker can make coins from her “honest miner” role and spend the coins
to generate some high-fee transactions sent to the Blockchain. This effect of the high-fee
transactions is to race against the transactions sent from honest ContractChecker clients and
to prevent them from being included in the Blockchain. The honest clients, in the hope of
including their transactions in the Blockchain, would be forced to increase their fee again,
which will be collected by the DoS attacker miner and inventive them to launch more DoS
attacks.
We believe the above attack is hard to succeed in existing public Blockchain which runs
in a large P2P network. The chance of making a perceivable amount of coins (by mining
and running smart contract) in today’s public Blockchain is slim. A self-sustainable DoS
attack would need a large investment (similar to 51% attack) to bootstrap. Without it, any
DoS attacker would lose coins and cannot sustain.
6 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the client cost in ContractChecker. We first present an analysis
of client cost and then present our experimental results.
6.1 Cost Analysis
Cost model: For a consistency verification protocol, either client-based schemes or Con-
tractChecker, its execution can be modeled by the following: Clients periodically send their
log attestations and check the consistency results. In this process, a client’s cost is charac-
terized by 1) how many operations the client needs to store, and 2) how long the client
needs to maintain an operation. In our cost model, we accredit to one cost unit storing one
operation by a client in one epoch. Given a process of T epochs, a client’s total cost is the
sum of cost units of all operations stored in the client in all epochs. If an operation is stored
continuously in a client for T epochs, it is counted as T units.
Based on the above model, we present a cost analysis of client-based auditing schemes
and ContractChecker.
Client cost in client-based auditing: In client-based auditing schemes, a client needs
to access operations submitted by all clients in the current epoch, including herself and
other clients; these operations may only need to be stored by the clients in one epoch, as-
suming a trusted third-party attester. For simplicity, we omit the cost of accessing historical
operations. Instead, we focus on a low-bound estimate of the client cost in client-based
auditing schemes:
CCostClientAudit ≥ T ·M ·N (1)
The above equation considers that the protocol is run in T epochs among N clients
where each client in one epoch submits M operations on average. The equation reports
the total cost. We focus on the “unit” client cost, that is, the client cost per epoch and per
operation:
CCostAvgClientAudit = CCostClientAudit/(T ·M) ≥ N (2)
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The above equation considers a client’s cost in a process of running client-based audit-
ing scheme in T epochs, with totally N clients where on average each client in one epoch
submitM operations.
Client cost in ContractChecker: In the above setting, a ContractChecker client only
needs to store her own operations, that is,M operation per epoch. But the ContractChecker
client needs to keep an operation for, instead of the current epoch, but an extended period of
time denoted by Ft/E epochs. Ft is the average delay for successfully submitting a client
attestation to the Blockchain in ContractChecker. Specifically,
Ft = r · (B · F + P ) (3)
Here r is the average times to resubmit a client attestation, and F /B/P is the finality de-
lay/block time/average wait time for transaction validation. Thus, ContractChecker’s client
cost is as follows. Note that in ContractChecker, log auditing is fully delegated and clients
are relieved from accessing historical operations.
CCostAvgContractChecker = Ft/E (4)
Therefore, the cost saving of ContractChecker comparing existing client-based auditing
schemes is:
CCost
Avg
ClientAudit
CCost
Avg
ContractChecker
≥ E·N
Ft
. This formula shows that the cost saving of Con-
tractChecker comparing existing work depends on three factors: the total attestation delay
Ft, the maximal number of clients N , and epoch time E. The larger E is, the more costs
the ContractChecker saves. Because with a largerE, the client-based schemes have to store
an operation for longer time. The larger Ft is, the fewer costs the ContractChecker saves.
Because with a larger Ft, an operation needs to be stored on a ContractChecker client for
longer time. The more clients there are (a larger N ), the more costs the ContractChecker
saves. Because with a largerN , the more operations a client needs to store (in client-based
auditing schemes).
6.2 Experiments
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Fig. 3: Client costs of ContractChecker
Client Cost Based on the cost model above, we design experiments for client cost mea-
surement. Our experiments focus on transaction-validation delay (P ) and maximal number
of operations (N ·M ), w.r.t. the budgeted amount of Ethers. Based on the results, we com-
pare ContractChecker’s client cost with that of client-based auditing schemes.
We design experiments to evaluate the client cost of ContractChecker in comparison
with client-based auditing schemes. From our cost analysis, the unit client cost of Con-
tractChecker is Ft/E (Equation 4) and that of client-based schemes is proportional to N
(Equation 2). The source of extra cost is that ContractChecker needs to maintain a local
operation for extra time and client-based schemes need to replicate a client’s operation to
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all other clients. In this section, we aim at comparing the client costs of these two scheme
paradigms using experiments.
Designing the experiments, we observe there are two factors affecting the cost, the
number of clients (i.e.,N ) and the number of operations per epoch (i.e.,M ). IncreasingN
andM , it will saturate the current block ingesting the operations in an epoch and delays the
inclusion of all operations to next blocks. We thus design experiments to measure Ft with
varyingN andM . We consider the setting thatE is longer than Ft such that the Blockchain
will not permanently drop transactions. To measure Ft, we run N clients to concurrently
submit their attestation transactions to the Blockchain. TheN clients then proactively check
the finality of the transactions. For simplicity, we use the maximal transaction fee to reduce
the transaction pending time and exclude the case of dropped transactions. We record the
time duration between the first transaction is submitted and the last transaction is finalized
on Blockchain.
Experiment setup: We conduct experiments in a private Ethereum testnet and a public
testnet. For the public testnet, we connect our ContractChecker protocol to the Ropsten
testnet [10]. For the private testnet, we run four Ethereum miners in an LAN network on
campus. The machine specs is Intel 8-core i7-6820HK CPU of 2.70GHz, 32 GB RAM and
1 TB Disk. The default configuration for Ethereum (e.g., difficulty levels) is used. Note
that our target metrics (e.g., transaction fee and Gas) are independent of network scale. We
deploy our smart-contract program written in Solidity to the Blockchain, by leveraging an
online Python tool4.
We present the client costs with varying N (number of clients) in Figure 3a and
Figure 3b. In this experiment, we consider M = 1 (each client submits one operation
in one epoch) for the maximal scalability. From Figure 3a, it can be seen that Con-
tractChecker incurs much lower unit client cost than client-based schemes. With increas-
ing number of clients, the client-based schemes incur a linearly increasing cost, while the
ContractChecker’s cost barely changes (it slightly increases as shown and analyzed in Fig-
ure 3b). The reason behind is that with a new client, the client-based schemes require to
replicate a given operation while ContractChecker does not replicate local operations to the
new client. With an increasing N , the number of operations per epoch may increase, and
that causes ContractChecker’s client cost to increase — with more operations in an epoch,
it takes more blocks to include the operations, thus longer Ft. This can be seen in Figure 3b
more clearly. More specifically, with the public testnet, it takes one blocks to include all op-
erations produced by up toN = 200 clients, takes two blocks by up to 370 clients, etc. The
private Blockchain testnet incurs a slightly higher client cost than the public Blockchain5,
and also has lower variance. Note that the increase rate of ContractChecker withN is much
slower than that of client-based schemes.
We present the client costs with varyingM (the average number of operations per epoch
per client) in Figure 3c. In this experiment, we considerN = 132 clients so that we can test
up to M = 100 operations. The result shows that ContractChecker’s client cost is about
one fifth of client-based auditing schemes’ cost. With the increasingM , ContractChecker’s
cost slightly increases.
Blockchain Availability and Transaction Fee In this experiment, our goal is to show the
relationship between Blockchain write availability and transaction fee. We simultaneously
4 https://github.com/ConsenSys/ethjsonrpc
5 This result is a bit surprising to us, as the private Blockchain testnet is dedicated to Con-
tractChecker while the public testnet is shared. We verify this is due to that in the private testnet
a block can be utilized up to 80% of specified gas limits, while the public testnet a block can be
utilized 100%.
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Fig. 4: Blockchain availability under varying transaction fee
run two Ethereum clients (on two separate machines), each of which drives 1500 transac-
tions to the Ropsten testnet. The two clients respectively use high transaction fee (20∗10−9
Ether) and low fee (1∗10−9 Ether). All transactions are driven to the Blockchain at the time
of one block (with the relative block height 0) and we observe how and when transactions
of different fees get included in the Blockchain. We repeatedly conduct 10 experiments and
present the averaged result in Figure 4. In this figure, all 1500 transactions with high fee
are included in the blocks before (or with smaller block height) the other 1500 transactions
with low fee. More specifically, the 1500 transactions of high fee takes about 6 blocks to be
included while the 1500 transactions of low fee takes up to 10 blocks to be included. This
result shows that with higher transaction fee, transactions get included earlier and it is less
likely to drop the transactions with lower fee.
7 Conclusion
This work presents ContractChecker, a lightweight consistency verification protocol based
on public Blockchain. It presents a new approach by auditing the storage log on the
Blockchain, and has advantages in saving the clients’ cost and lower availability require-
ments. ContractChecker is implemented in a middleware system federating cloud services,
clients and the Blockchain.
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